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Greener Governments: Partisan Ideologies, Executive Institutions and Environmental Policies 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Why do some governments have more environmentally friendly policies than others? Part of the 
answer involves governing parties' ideological positions on environmentalism and the constraints 
imposed by executive institutions. This paper elaborates this party-based explanation and tests it with 
uniquely comparable indicators of national environmental policies for governments in 27 countries in 
the European Union. The findings show that governments with parties that emphasized environmental 
protection in their manifestos are more likely to propose pro-environment policies during EU-level 
negotiations. However, the effect of ideology is mediated by the centralization of the national executive 
branch. In centralized national executives the environmental positions of prime ministers' parties affect 
policies, while in decentralized national executives the positions of environment ministers' parties are 
relevant. The findings have implications for understanding the impact of partiesÕ environmental 
positions on government policies, as well as for policymaking in coalitions more generally. 
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This study examines the impact of political partiesÕ attention to environmental protection on 
governmentsÕ policy outputs. Parties have responded to environmental problems and public concern for 
the environment by devoting attention to this theme in their electoral appeals, although the extent to 
which they have responded has varied across parties and elections (Mller-Rommel 2002; Mller-
Rommel and Poguntke 2002; Carter 2013; Cao, Milner, Prakash and Ward 2014; Spoon et al. 2014). 
Environmentalism is now a salient electoral issue and part of a new dimension of politics 
(Rohrschneider 1993; Hooghe et al. 2002). The question we ask is, under what conditions do 
governments adopt policies to protect the environment when parties that espouse support for the 
environment are in office? It is clearly not always the case that governments do so. Despite the 
commitment to environmental protection by mainstream parties in France, Germany and the UK in the 
mid 2000s, these governmentsÕ commitment to environmental protection waned at the global climate 
change conference in 2009. So whether mainstream partiesÕ commitment to the environment is more 
than Òa passing fadÓ of little consequence for policy is an apt question (Carter 2013, p.90).  
 
The extent to which governing parties follow through on the commitments they made during previous 
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election campaigns is also relevant to many strands of democratic theory, which posit that citizens have 
indirect control over public policies through elections and parties (Dahl 1991; Mansbridge 2003). 
Election results give certain parties or combinations of parties the potential to form governments, 
which in turn should shape the ideological makeup of governments and the policies they pursue. 
Responsible parties that enter government have the ability and obligation to implement the principles 
they supported during the previous election campaign. This idea is a prominent feature of the mandate 
theory of democracy and the responsible party model (Downs 1957; Klingemann et al. 1994; Powell 
2000), which set out a democratic chain of command and control through which voters influence public 
policies. Party ideologies are an important part of this chain, because voters rely on them as cognitive 
devices to simplify the complexity of politics (Van der Eijk et al. 2005). Consequently, democratic 
theorists expect there to be a correspondence between governing parties' ideological positions and 
governmentsÕ policies. 
 
We offer theoretical and empirical contributions to research in this area. With respect to theory, we 
develop propositions about the conditions under which parties' ideological positions, in particular the 
strength of their commitment to environmental protection, affect government policies. These 
propositions focus on the distinction between the positions of the party of the prime minister and of the 
environment minister, which may differ in coalition governments, as well as the degree of 
centralization of the executive branch. In doing so, we seek to identify the conditions under which 
parties matter for policymaking (Schmidt 1996; Guinaudeau 2014), rather than simply asking whether 
parties matter. The specific institutional context on which we focus, the centralization of the executive 
branch, has received relatively little attention until now. 
 
Our empirical contribution is to examine the impact of partiesÕ environmentalism on a set of uniquely 
comparable indicators of national governmentsÕ policies on environmental issues. We examine the 
policy positions taken by national governments of the member states of the European Union in EU-
level negotiations. This arena offers a set of observations in which national governments composed of 
parties with markedly different policy positions and domestic institutional arrangements (our key 
independent variables) take positions on the same specific policy issues (our dependent variable).  
 
Most previous analyses of governments' environmental policies, as well as studies of other policy 
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areas, were unable to draw on such directly comparable indicators, and instead focused on aggregate 
indicators of policy outcomes such as greenhouse gas emissions (e.g. Neumayer 2003; Scruggs 2003; 
Jensen and Spoon 2011). These studies have revealed important insights. Jensen and Spoon (2011) for 
example find that governments that are more pro-environment and cohesive make more rapid progress 
toward their environmental targets than less pro-environment and cohesive governments. Outcomes are 
of primary concern to policymakers and citizens, but policy outputs are of primary relevance to theories 
of the effects of the partisan composition of government office (Knill et al. 2010, p. 302). Outcomes 
such as levels of emissions are likely to be influenced by a range of factors other than the policies of 
national governments, including the behavior of citizens and industries.  
 
Our work also differs from other related research that is based on aggregate indicators of policy outputs 
and/or relatively small numbers of observations. Some of this work has demonstrated that the 
ideological positions of governments and legislators affect government policies (e.g. Ward and Cao 
2014). Knill et al. (2010) examine evidence consisting of 96 observations of the number of 
environmental measures adopted by governments in 18 OECD countries at four time points. They find 
that the number of environmental measures increases when the policy positions of governing parties are 
more pro-environment. Their evidence also suggests that the existence of a ministerial portfolio that 
deals exclusively with environmental issues is associated with a greater number of environmental 
measures. Building on the work of Tosun (2014), Bck et al (2015) focused on the adoption of bans on 
the cultivation of GMO crops in EU member states. They found that such bans were more likely when 
Christian Democratic parties were in office, and particularly when they held the relevant ministerial 
portfolio. An unavoidable limitation of their study is that fact that there were relatively few such bans: 
ten in total. The fact that they found significant effects may indicate that the magnitude of such partisan 
variables could be substantial. Our research design is distinct in that it offers more information than 
previous quantitative studies on the substantive policies adopted by each government in our sample 
compared to other governments; we are able to rank governments relative to each other on the same 
specific policy issues. Moreover, the fact that we examine a greater number of observations enables us 
to test more refined mechanisms concerning the allocation of ministerial portfolios and executive 
institutions than has been possible until now. 
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By focusing on national governments' policy positions on proposed EU laws, our study also relates to 
research on governmentsÕ policies on international environmental agreements. In a previous study in 
this journal, Schulze (2014) demonstrated that governments composed of parties that place a greater 
emphasis on environmental protection were more likely to ratify global environmental agreements. 
While this is an important finding, the ratification of global agreements is not the strongest test of the 
impact of partisanship. Downs et al. (1996) observe that states comply with international agreements 
because they require activities that states would have performed on their own, or because compliance 
requires little policy change. In contrast, by focusing on national governmentsÕ policy positions on 
controversial issues raised by proposed EU laws, we examine situations in which the collective 
decision is rarely in line with the national policy positions of all member states. This means that at least 
some member states are likely to have to change their national policies. Moreover, compared to 
international agreements, the EU has a well-developed set of compliance mechanisms at the 
supranational level, including the European Court of Justice. This offers a compelling test of the impact 
of partiesÕ environmental positions on national governments' policies.  
 
How Parties' Environmentalism Affects Government Policies 
 
Ideology is commonly defined as a set of principles that help people to interpret the world as it is and 
how it should be (Denzau and North 2000, 24). We conceive of partiesÕ commitment to environmental 
protection as a component of their ideological positions, and differences among parties in this respect 
as a question of degree rather than type. This conception of partiesÕ environmental positions is akin to 
the spatial conception of ideology that distinguishes among parties by their positioning on one or more 
dimensions that summarize the ideological principles to which they adhere (Downs 1957). Although 
parties take positions on ideological dimensions in line with their historical and societal origins, they 
may shift positions in the process of party competition and internal party politics. The spatial approach 
has been dominated by references to the generic left-right dimension. The content of the left-right 
dimension differs among political systems, but it commonly characterizes differences of principle on 
the appropriate role of the state in society. Some analyses distinguish between an economic or 
socioeconomic left-right dimension, which refers mainly to state intervention in the economy, and the 
social left-right dimension, which refers to state intervention on moral issues. Hooghe et al. (2002) 
argue that green politics is part of a new dimension of ideological contestation: the distinction between 
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green, alternative and libertarian principles (GAL) on the one hand and traditional, authoritarian and 
nationalist principles on the other (TAN).  
 
The party family approach to ideology, by contrast, implies that ideology is a categorical variable. The 
family approach distinguishes among parties by the family types to which they belong: as well as green 
parties, conservative, social democratic, liberal, etc. (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Mair and Mudde 1998). 
The family approach captures differences and similarities among parties in terms of their principles, 
historical development and societal origins. With respect to green parties, the family approach 
highlights the distinct origins of many green parties in peace, anti-nuclear and feminist movements 
(Mller-Rommel and Poguntke 2002). If we follow the general principle of maximizing variation on 
our independent variable, then the spatial approach is preferable because it offers more nuanced 
variation in ideological positioning.
1 
 
The spatial approach to ideology is particularly appropriate when examining the impact of partiesÕ 
environmental positions on governmentsÕ policies on specific environmental issues. Mainstream 
political parties have sought to respond to environmental concerns to varying degrees (Rohrschneider 
1993; Mller-Rommel and Poguntke 2002). Carter (2013) found that both left and right-wing 
mainstream parties emphasize environmental protection in their manifestos, and found some evidence 
that left-wing parties are more inclined to accommodate environmental concerns. Similarly, Spoon et 
al. (2014) found substantial variation among mainstream parties in the extent to which they have 
emphasized environmental protection in their manifestos. Mainstream left-wing parties, and 
mainstream parties that faced electorally successful green parties, place more emphasis on 
environmental protection. Our research examines whether such variation in partiesÕ positions affects 
the policies adopted by governments when those parties are in office. The party family approach, by 
contrast, would examine differences among parties in terms of their categorization into different 
families, such as green, social democratic, Christian democratic and conservative. Although this is 
possible, as the work of Tosun (2014) and Bck et al. (2015) demonstrates with interesting results, the 
limitation of the party-family approach is that it treats parties within the same family as equivalent, 
                                                
1. The party family approach may be a better starting point for other research questions. For instance, if we wished to 
examine how ideology affects party members' sense of identity, then the family approach may be preferable. 
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while we know that they differ markedly in the degree of their commitment to environmental 
protection. In addition, there are relatively few cases of genuinely green parties entering government 
office, despite recent examples in the Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland and Latvia among other 
places. These cases of green party government participation are worthy of study in themselves (Rdig 
2006), but they are too infrequent to explain the substantial variation we observe in governments' 
environmental policies. 
 
We consider the environmental positions of the parties of both the prime minister and the 
environmental minister, which are obviously the same in single-party governments, but may differ in 
coalitions. An extensive theoretical literature points to the policy influence of prime ministerial parties 
in multi-party coalitions (e.g. Austen-Smith and Banks 1988; Diermeier and Feddersen 1998; Dewan 
and Hortala-Vallve 2011). The mechanisms through which prime ministerial parties influence policy 
consists of their power position relative to junior coalition members, the actions they can take during 
the formation of a government, and the actions they can take during the course of the governing period. 
Prime ministerial parties in coalitions are usually the largest parties and hold the median legislator. 
They usually lead the formation of the coalition and the government agreement, which sets out the 
governmentÕs policies for the next period. Prime ministerial parties can therefore select coalition 
partners that are likely to produce government policies congruent with their policy preferences. 
Prospective prime ministerial parties also have considerable influence on the allocation and design of 
ministerial portfolios, which provides additional opportunities to influence government policies. One 
model details how prime ministerial parties can adjust the policy jurisdictions of ministerial portfolios 
to ensure that government policies are in line with their preferences (Dewan and Hortala-Vallve 2011). 
During the course of the governing period, prime ministerial parties can use the threat of votes of 
confidence to exert control over their junior coalition partners (Diermeier and Feddersen 1998). If 
prime ministerial parties hold a vote of confidence, this compels coalition partners to either accept the 
policy proposal of the prime ministerial party or the fall of the coalition. There are therefore ample 
reasons to expect the prime ministerial party's position on environmental protection to affect the 
government's environmental policies.  
 
The party ideology of the environment minister is a separate explanatory variable in our model. 
According to the portfolio allocation model of coalition formation, the party of the minister responsible 
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for any given policy area exerts most control over that area (Laver and Shepsle 1996). One of the 
mechanisms through which this control is exerted consists of commitment mechanisms in relation to 
the coalition agreement. According to the portfolio allocation model, parties will only find a coalition 
agreement credible if it is backed up by the allocation of ministerial portfolios, which means that the 
parties controlling each portfolio get to implement their own preferred policies within their ministerial 
jurisdictions. A distinct mechanism through which ministers exert control concerns ministerial drift 
(Huber and Shipan 2002, p. 185; Martin and Vanberg 2004, p. 15-6). Here, the argument is that parties 
have incentives to deviate from the agreements they reached with their coalition partners if those 
agreements do not perfectly reflect their preferences. The division of ministerial portfolios gives 
ministers advantages in terms of information and control over policies, which are opportunities to 
follow these incentives.  
 
We posit that the effects of prime ministers and ministers on government policies are amplified or 
muted by the degree of centralization of the executive branch (Kassim et al. 2000; Kassim 2013). The 
centralization of the executive refers to coordination procedures that enable the cabinet as a whole, and 
the chief executive in particular, to impose coherence on government policies across different areas. 
While these procedures may be adjusted from time to time, they are relatively stable, institutionalized 
structures that tend to outlast particular governments. They encompass coordinating structures at the 
political and administrative levels. At the political level, relevant coordinating procedures consist of 
interministerial committees and/or a powerful coordinating office under the direct control of the prime 
minister, which enforce requirements for ministers to report to each other and the prime minister. At 
the administrative level, they consist of interministerial committees of senior officials. We expect the 
degree of executive centralization to have an important mitigating effect on the extent to which 
environment ministers and their parties influence the government's environmental policies. We expect 
environment ministers and their parties' influence to be strongest in decentralized executives and 
weakest in centralized executives. 
 
Our expectations are summarized in the following propositions: 
 
PartiesÕ positions on the environment 
1. The more pro-environmental the party of the prime minister, the stronger the governmentÕs 
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environmental policies on specific policy issues. 
2. The more pro-environmental the party of the environment minister, the stronger the 
governmentÕs environmental policies on specific policy issues. 
 
PartiesÕ positions on the environment combined with executive institutions 
1. The influence of the prime minister's environmentalism on government policies is greater in 
centralized than in decentralized executives. 
2. The influence of the environmental minister's ideological environmentalism on government 
policies is greater in decentralized than in centralized executives. 
 
In addition to the variables referred to in our hypotheses, our analyses also include several control 
variables, including interdependence and economic development, which are mentioned in the research 
design. Some of these are particularly relevant to our testing ground, the European Union. 
 
The European Union as a Testing Ground 
 
The EU provides an appropriate testing ground for studying the impact of national parties' ideological 
environmentalism on their national governments' policy positions on specific environmental issues. We 
examine variation in the extent to which the national governments of EU member states take pro-
environment policy positions on specific environmental issues when these issues are discussed in the 
Council of the EU. These specific environmental issues include funding for environmental programs, 
emission targets, and environmental standards for products. The fact that different governments take 
positions on the same specific environmental issues provides comparable observations for our 
dependent variable. EU member states vary considerably in the partisan composition of their 
governments and in their national policymaking institutions, as well as in levels of economic 
development. This provides variation in the explanatory variables referred to above. 
 
We focus on legislative decision-making, which takes place in the context of inter-institutional 
negotiations involving the European Commission, the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of the 
EU. In this study we concentrate on the Council, in which member states are represented. However, the 
analyses also take into account the policy positions of the European Commission and the EP. 
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The Council is divided into sectoral Councils that focus on different policy areas. Given our focus on 
environmental policymaking, many of the specific policy issues we select were discussed partly or 
exclusively by the environment configuration of the Council of the EU. However, other configurations 
of the Council also discussed policy issues that raised environmental concerns. For instance, the 
fisheries ministers regularly considered conservation issues. Each configuration of the Council is 
affected by other parts of the Council, both horizontally and vertically. This gives environment 
ministers the opportunity to monitor and influence their fellow national ministers' behavior in other 
configurations of the Council. Below the ministerial level, many committees prepare ministers' 
decisions. The Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) sits at the top of this committee 
structure and provides for a degree of horizontal integration. Below this, there are many working 
groups composed of officials from each country. These officials are either based in their member states' 
permanent representations to the EU or in relevant national ministries. Legislative proposals are passed 
up and down the Council hierarchy during the decision-making process. Lower level committees may 
pass an issue they were unable to resolve upwards. Ministers may agree the general contours of a 
settlement and instruct lower level committees to work out the details. This complexity of the Council 
in terms of the multiple pathways of influence means that it provides a demanding test of the effect of 
partisan ideology on governments' policy positions. 
 
Research Design 
 
The data for our dependent variable -- governments' policy positions on specific environmental issues -
- are taken from the Decision-making in the EU (DEU) project (Thomson et al. 2006; Thomson et al. 
2012). The DEU project examined 331 controversial issues from 125 legislative proposals from a range 
of policy areas, and we base our analyses on 55 of these issues from 27 proposals that raised 
environmental concerns and on which we have data on our explanatory variables.
2
 The DEU project 
selected only those legislative proposals that carried at least some political importance and controversy, 
that were subject to either the consultation or the codecision procedures and from only those that 
arrived on the Council's agenda in the years 1999 and/or 2000, or were discussed for the first time in 
                                                
2. Table A.1 in the online appendix gives a summary of the environmental issues raised in these legislative proposals. When 
a legislative proposal raised both environmental and non-environmental issues, we included the environmental issues and 
excluded the non-environmental ones. 
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the Council after the 2004 enlargement. 
 
For each of these legislative proposals, the DEU researchers conducted semi-structured interviews with 
key informants to describe the controversial policy issues that each proposal raised and each of the 
main decision-making actors' positions on each policy issue. The data on the 55 environmental issues 
we examine here were collected in 103 semi-structured interviews, which lasted an average of 60 
minutes. Most of the interviewees (72) were officials from member states' permanent representations 
and included a balance of northern and southern, as well as old and new member states. The remaining 
interviewees were officials from the Commission (22) and the EP (9). The interviews on each proposal 
were held when the proposal was being discussed in the Council or soon afterwards. To elicit the 
positions of member states on each specific policy issue, key informants were presented with a list that 
included all member states and were asked to Ôindicate the policy alternative initially favored by each 
stakeholder after the introduction of the proposal and before the Council formulated its common 
position.Õ During the course of these semi-structured interviews, each issue was represented in the form 
of a policy scale, ranging from 0 to 100, which referred to the most extreme positions taken on the 
issue.
3 
 
The units of analysis are member states' positions on each controversial issue. Of the 55 policy issues 
selected, 17 were raised by legislative proposals that were introduced in the years prior to 2004, when 
the EU had 15 member states; 10 of the policy issues were raised in the years 2004 to 2006 when the 
EU had 25 members; and the remaining 28 policy issues were raised by legislative proposal introduced 
after the 2007 enlargement when the EU expanded to 27 members (all were discussed before the EU 
enlarged to 28 members with the accession of Croatia in 2013). Not all member states took positions on 
all issues, either because they were unable to form a coherent national position or because they were 
indifferent. Taking into account missing data on our dependent and independent variables, we have 909 
observations in our analyses.  
 
[ INSERT TABLE 1 ] 
                                                
3. Tests to compare the informants' judgments with information from Council and EP documentation and with the estimates 
of different informants support the validity and reliability of these estimates (Thomson et al. 2006, 329-47). In addition, 
Knig et al. (2007) compared 31 point estimates provided by key informants from the Council with estimates from 
informants in the EP and found that 30 match perfectly or almost perfectly. 
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Table 1 contains information on actors' positions on the policy issues raised by the proposal on waste 
(COD/2005/281). This proposal was introduced by the Commission to ensure a harmonized EU-wide 
system of dealing with household waste. One of the controversial policy issues related to the 
classification of waste incinerators as either recovery operations or disposal operations. This distinction 
is important because waste recovery operations are permitted to handle imported waste and also go 
towards meeting recovery targets set by other EU legislation. As mentioned above, during the data 
collection each policy issue was represented as a scale from 0 to 100. The environmental issues were 
coded so that position 100 on the scale is the ÔgreenestÕ position. On the incineration issue, the green 
position is that incineration should not be classed as recovery under any circumstances. At the opposite 
end of the scale, on position 0, is the ÔbrownÕ position that most incinerators could be classed as 
recovery operations.  Three other alternatives were put forward, and key informants placed these 
between the outlying positions to reflect the political distances between them. The main political 
difference was between the EP that favored the continuation of the status quo, which meant that no 
incineration is classed as waste (position 100), and member states and the Commission that wished to 
classify incineration as recovery at least if certain conditions were met. The outcome was more in line 
with the positions of the member states and Commission than with the position of the EP.  
 
The second issue in Table 1 refers to a disagreement on whether the EU should impose waste 
prevention targets on member states. The structure of the positions is similar in that the EP took the 
strongest environmental position, while the Commission and member states took either the weakest 
environmental position or intermediate positions. The third issue concerns the question of whether the 
EU should impose targets for recycling. Here, the actors divided into two groups. The first group, 
which consisted of the Commission and 20 member states, argued against targets for recycling. We 
describe this as the weakest environmental position. The second group, which consisted of the EP and 
five member states, argued for the introduction of such targets. We describe this as the strongest 
environmental position. 
 
We construct a three-category ordinal variable as our dependent variable. This variable identifies 
whether the member state in question took the weakest environmental position (which is always 
position 0 on our policy scales), an intermediate position (between 0 and 100) or the strongest 
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environmental position (which is always position 100 on our policy scales).
4
 A recent simulation-based 
study examined the effects of measurement error in the DEU dataset on the robustness of inferences 
regarding the predictive accuracy of alternative decision models (Leinaweaver and Thomson 2014). It 
argued that analyses should take into account the clustering of actors' positions into distinct groups, as 
we do in the present study. Moreover, our three-category operationalization avoids making direct 
comparisons of say a 50 on one policy scale with a 60 on another scale. Instead, our dependent variable 
treats these values as equivalent in that they are both ÔintermediateÕ positions. 
 
The main explanatory variables in our analysis include the ideological environmentalism of prime 
ministers and environment ministers' parties. For these variables we use data from the Comparative 
Manifestos Project (CMP; Klingemann et al. 2006). The CMP dataset contains information on the 
percentage of each party's manifesto or proxy document, such as a leaders' campaign speech, devoted 
to each of 56 thematic categories. The documents are unitized to divide them up into sentences or 
quasi-sentences. Human coders categorized each unit into one of the 56 categories. The category on 
which we focus is ÔEnvironmental Protection: PositiveÕ (theme 501), which has been used as an 
indicator of partiesÕ commitment to environmental protection in several previous studies cited earlier 
(Knill et al. 2010; Carter 2013; Spoon et al. 2014). This category is reserved for sentences or quasi-
sentences that refer to ÔGeneral policies in favor of protecting the environment, fighting climate 
change, and other 'green' policies. For instance: General protection of natural resources; Preservation of 
countryside, forests etc.; Protection of natural parks; Animal rights.Õ For each case, we take the CMP 
measures of the ideological environmentalism of the prime minister and environment minister's parties 
for their manifestos immediately prior to the date on which the legislative proposal was introduced. The 
original CMP measures are highly skewed. We therefore take the natural log of these original 
measures, after adding one so as to obtain values for parties that devote none of their manifesto to 
environmentalism and to avoid the steepest part of the logarithmic function between zero and one (See 
Table A.2 of the online appendix for descriptive statistics).
5
 As part of our robustness tests, we apply 
Benoit et alÕs. (2009) approach to modeling uncertainty in CMP estimates and find that our results 
hold. 
                                                
4. Figure A.1 in the online appendix illustrates the distribution of the original positional variable and the three-category 
ordinal variable we use. 
5. Our measures of the ideological environmentalism of the prime ministerial and environment ministerial parties are not 
highly correlated (r=.34). We also perform separate analysis on the cases in which the ideological environmentalism of the 
prime ministerÕs and environment ministerÕs parties differ. 
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To measure the centralization of the executive branch, we refer to Kassim's (2013) typology, which 
draws on his and other researchers' qualitative work on the organization of national executives with 
respect to the interaction between national governments and the EU (e.g. Kassim et al. 2000; Laffan 
2006; Grtner et al. 2011). Kassim (2013) distinguishes between centralized and decentralized 
executives with respect to the distribution of power among different departments. Centralized 
governments constrain individual ministers with a range of mechanisms, including the presence of a 
clear coordinating role for the prime minister's office, interdepartmental committees and a strong 
permanent representation of the member state to the EU. According to Kassim (2013), the following 
states have decentralized executives: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The other 14 member states of the 
EU-27 (before the 2013 enlargement with Croatia) have centralized executives.
6
  
 
Our control variables incorporate the effects of interdependence, in the sense that the policy of any 
given government may depend on the policies of other governments and European institutions. We 
count the number of member states (excluding the member state in the case in question) that took the 
strongest environmental position on each issue. This variable has a value of zero for all states on the 
issues of waste incineration and waste prevention targets (Table 1), since only the EP took the strongest 
environmental position. On the issue of recycling, it has a value of five for all states with the exception 
of Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Portugal and Spain, for which it has a value of four. Excluding the 
member state referred to in the dependent variable in each case from the count of strongest 
environmental positions ensures we do not include the same information on both sides of the equation 
in our statistical model. We also include variables that control for whether the Commission and EP 
took the strongest environmental position. These do not feature in our expectations, but are appropriate 
control variables in the context of EU decision-making. We also control for GDP per capita, since we 
expect states with higher levels of GDP to have more environmentally friendly policies. We employ 
Eurostat data on GDP per inhabitant in Euros in the year in which the legislative proposal in question 
was introduced. The GDP data are divided by 1,000 and are in 2009 prices. The GDP per capita 
variable is also skewed, and we therefore take the natural log of it.  
                                                
6. Kassim (2013) also distinguishes among systems on the basis of whether their coordination ambition is comprehensive or 
selective, which indicates whether or not coordination is confined to nationally salient issues. Since all our cases refer to 
controversial issues, they are nationally salient to at least some extent; we therefore do not include this second dimension. 
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Analysis 
 
Multinomial logit models are presented in Table 2 rather than ordered logit models because the data 
violate the parallel regression assumption of ordered logit.
7
 The coefficients estimate the effect of 
changes in the explanatory variables on the likelihood that states take intermediate versus weak 
environmental positions (1 vs. 0) and strong versus weak environmental positions (2 vs. 0).  
 
Model 1 in Table 2 includes only the direct effects of the environmentalism of prime ministers and 
environment ministersÕ parties, without controlling for the degree of centralization in the government 
executive. A comparison of the effects with those found in Model 2, which does include executive 
centralization, demonstrates the importance of including this executive institution. The effect of prime 
ministerial partiesÕ environmental positions is smaller, although still positive and significant, in Model 
1, compared to the conditional effect in Model 2, which does include this variable. Specifically, in 
Model 1 the coefficient referring to the effect of prime ministerial partiesÕ environmentalism on the 
likelihood that governments take strong versus weak policy positions is .52 (s.e.=.22, p=.02). In Model 
2, this effect is .89 (s.e. .30, p=.00, combining the direct effect of .04 and the conditional effect of .85 
and recalculating the relevant standard error). A similar and even stronger pattern is evident regarding 
the effects of environment ministersÕ parties. Model 1 does not provide any evidence that environment 
ministersÕ parties affect policy. Only when executive centralization is included is it apparent that 
environment ministers have a marked effect on government policy in decentralized executives. Model 2 
indicates that in decentralized executives, environment ministersÕ environmental positions significantly 
and positively affects the likelihood that the government takes both an intermediate versus a weak (1 
vs. 0) and a strong versus a weak (2 vs. 0) policy. In centralized executives, environment ministersÕ 
parties do not have a significant effect on governmentsÕ policy positions. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 2 ] 
 
[ INSERT FIGURE 1 ] 
                                                
7. The Brant Test was applied to the ordered logit version the second model in Table 2, and this indicated that the parallel 
regression assumption was violated (Χ² for all coefficients together of 256.24, p=00). 
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The magnitudes and significance of the effects from Model 2 are depicted in Figure 1. In line with the 
above interpretation, the effect of the prime ministerial party's environmental positions is positive and 
differs significantly from zero in centralized systems for the comparison between the strongest and 
weakest government policies. In decentralized systems by contrast, there is no effect of the prime 
ministerial partyÕs environmental positions. The opposite is true of the effects for environment 
ministers. Environment ministersÕ positions also affect the likelihood that governments adopt 
intermediate versus weak environmental policies. Figure 1 adds that for both prime ministers and 
environment ministers there is a significant difference between their effects in the two domestic 
institutional contexts of centralized and decentralized executives with respect to the likelihood that 
governments adopt she strongest versus the weakest environmental policies. 
 
The effects found in Model 2 are depicted as predicted probabilities in Figure 2, holding other variables 
constant at their means (for continuous variables) or modes (for dichotomous variables). Figure 2 
shows that for a state with a centralized executive and prime ministerial party with the lowest level of 
commitment to environmental protection (a value of 0), the probability it takes the weakest 
environmental position on a specific environmental issue is .64. This probability falls to .37 for a 
similar state with a prime ministerial party with the highest observed level of commitment to 
environmental protection (a value of 2.6 or approximately 13% of the manifesto focused on 
"environmental protection"). At the same time, the probability of taking the strongest ideological 
position on a specific environmental issue increases from .07 to .40. In other words, states with 
centralized executives and prime ministerial parties with low levels of commitment to environmental 
protection are more likely to take weak than strong environmental positions on specific issues. By 
contrast, if those states have prime ministerial parties with strong pro-environment positions, they are 
just as likely to take strong rather than weak environmental positions on specific issues. 
 
[ INSERT FIGURE 2 ] 
 
Figure 2 depicts a similar pattern for the effect of environment ministers in states with decentralized 
executives. At the lowest level of commitment to environmental protection observed in our sample (a 
value of 0), the probability that such a state takes the weakest environmental position on a specific 
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issue is .76, while the probability of taking the strongest position is a minuscule .05. By contrast, if a 
state with a decentralized executive has an environment minister whose party has the strongest pro-
environment position (a value of 3.82 or approximately 44% of the manifesto focused on 
"environmental protection"), then the probability it takes the strongest environmental position on a 
specific issue leaps to .37, rising above the probability that such a state would take the weakest 
environmental position on a specific issue (.33).
8 
 
Table 2 also contains Models 3 and 4, which divide the sample into cases in which the prime minister 
and environment minister were from the same party (Model 3) and cases in which they were from 
different parties (Model 4). Model 3 therefore includes only the ideological position of the prime 
ministerial party, since this is identical to that of the environment ministerÕs party. The effect of this 
variable, which is positive and significant with respect to the likelihood that governments take strong 
versus weak (2 vs. 0) policy positions, is therefore the combined effect of both prime ministers and 
environment ministers. The results of Model 4 are more relevant to our propositions regarding the 
conditional effects of executive centralization and are similar to those of Model 2. The effect of prime 
ministersÕ parties on the strong versus weak comparison of policy positions is positive and significant 
in centralized executives (b=1.70, s.e.=.63, p=.01, combining the direct and indirect effects in Model 
4), but insignificant in decentralized executives. Meanwhile, the effect of environment ministersÕ 
parties on the strong versus weak comparison of policy positions is positive and significant in 
decentralized systems, but insignificant in centralized systems (b=.40, s.e. = .51, p=.43, again 
combining the direct and indirect effects). 
 
We tested the robustness of our findings to different model specifications and present the most 
important of these in more detail in the online appendix. Our main findings concerning parties' 
ideologies and executive centralization are robust to methods including the use of multilevel models to 
capture issue heterogeneity, tests to incorporate uncertainty in the CMP measures (Benoit et al. (2009), 
tests to identify whether any single state was driving the results and simulated error in Kassim's 
categorization of national executives as either centralized or decentralized. 
                                                
8. The Italian FdV Green Federation represents the most Ôideologically environmentalÕ party in our observations. The Italian 
Greens produced party manifestos that emphasized environmental protection at a consistently high level across most of the 
manifestos reviewed by the CMP project (up to 44% in the mid to late 1990s). Re-estimating Model 2 from Table 2 while 
omitting the Italian FdV Green Federation does not significantly alter our coefficient estimates. 
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Conclusions 
 
The extent to which governing parties favor environmental protection, as measured by their electoral 
appeals, affects the strength of their governments' policies on specific environmental issues. This 
suggests that in addition to adopting green rhetoric, parties do at least, to some extent, follow through 
with green policies when they enter government office. Green politics is an integral part of political 
competition in modern democracies with mainstream parties espousing support for environmentalism 
to varying degrees (Rohrschneider 1993; Hooghe et al. 2002; Mller-Rommel 2002; Mller-Rommel 
and Poguntke 2002; Carter 2013; Cao et al. 2014; Spoon et al. 2014). Our findings add to a growing 
body of comparative studies that examine the effects of partiesÕ commitment to environmental 
protection on governmentsÕ environmental policies (e.g. Knill et al. 2010; Schulze 2014; Ward and Cao 
2014; Bck et al. 2015).  
Our work offers theoretical and empirical contributions to existing scholarship. With respect to 
theory, we contribute to knowledge concerning the conditions under which parties matter (Schmidt 
1996; Guinaudeau 2014), and the particular condition on which we focus is the centralization of the 
executive, which has received little attention until now. We posited and found evidence for the 
proposition that in centralized executives the party of the prime minister affects policy, while in 
decentralized executives the party of the environment minister affects policy. This finding is relevant to 
theoretical and empirical work that examines the distribution of ministerial portfolios across a range of 
policy areas (Laver and Shepsle 1996; Goodhart 2013) and executive institutions that coordinate 
policies across government departments (Kassim 2005; Dewan and Hortala-Vallve 2011). Given the 
evidence for the impact of executive centralization, future research should continue to develop our 
understanding of this and related mechanisms. Lipsmeyer and Pierce's (2011) research suggests that 
junior ministers perform essentially the same function as the coordination mechanisms we examine. 
Other relevant lines of research examine the constraints imposed on ministers by legislative actors (e.g. 
Martin and Vanberg 2005; Str¿m et al. 2010). Specifying the institutional conditions under which 
governing parties affect policies is relevant to environmental policies, as well as policies in other areas.  
The empirical contribution was to develop a research design that offers comparable measures of 
governmentsÕ policies on the same specific issues. This allowed us to compare the strength of different 
governmentsÕ policies on the same issues and to include a large enough number of observations with 
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which to examine the institutional conditions under which prime ministersÕ and environment ministersÕ 
party affiliations affect policies. We argued that EU environmental policy is an appropriate testing 
ground for our propositions. This raises the empirical question of the extent to which our findings are 
generalizable to other policy areas in the EU and to policies outside the EU. It has been argued that the 
development of policymaking at the level of the European Union has empowered national chief 
executives at the expense of other actors in national governments and at the domestic level (Johansson 
and Tallberg 2010). This might suggest that chief executives have weaker effects and ministers have 
stronger effects on policies in countries and policy areas outside the EU. We would therefore welcome 
extensions of similar research designs to other arenas with the aim of formulating and testing 
theoretical propositions on the conditions under which parties affect policies. 
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Greener governments: Partisan ideologies, institutions and environmental policies 
 
Online Appendix 
 
This online appendix provides more detail on the environmental policy issues included in the analysis 
(Table A.1), the descriptive statistics for the analysis (Table A.2), a graphical comparison of the 
original positional variable and the three-category ordinal variable we use as a dependent variable 
(Figure A.1) and the results of robustness tests referred to in the main text. 
 
The first of these robustness tests, reported in Table A.3, replicates Model 2 of Table 2 using paired, 
multilevel logit models with random intercepts to account for the fact that our observations are nested 
within issues.
9
 While a multilevel approach is appealing because it allows us to account for the nested 
nature of our observations, it also carries with it additional modeling assumptions that are problematic 
given our data (e.g. non-independence of issues, proposals and/or states).
10
 The results of this first 
robustness test are consistent with those from our multinomial test in Table 2 although with slightly 
weakened significance levels, which is likely due to the much smaller number of observations in these 
paired logits. 
 
Table A.4 reports the results of a second robustness test that incorporates measurement error in the 
CMP estimates of parties' environmentalism as estimated by Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov (2009). 
These paired logit models were run using the simex package in R created by Lederer and Kchenhoff 
(2013) that implements the SIMEX algorithm of Cook and Stefanski (1994).
11
 The most relevant 
coefficients in these models refer to the effects of parties' environmentalism. As in the main analyses, 
the environmentalism of prime ministers' parties affects governments' positions in centralized 
executives, while the environmentalism of environmental ministers' parties matters in decentralized 
executives most clearly in the "2 vs 0" comparison. 
 
                                                
9
 We did not add a second level, that of either proposals or states, to the multilevel models in the robustness test since we 
have too few observations at the proposal level to justify doing so (< 30) and given the lack of independence that exists at 
the higher levels. 
10
 Given that concern, we also re-ran the models in Table 2 with standard errors clustered by issue and found similar results. 
11
 While it is appropriate to test the robustness of the findings to measurement error, including these measures of uncertainty 
involves additional assumptions, notably that there is more certainty regarding measures derived from shorter election 
platforms. 
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A third robustness test was run to determine if any single state was driving our main results. Model 2 of 
Table 2 was run 27 times, each time dropping a single member state from the analysis while recording 
the estimated coefficients and standard errors for the PM, environment minister and their interaction 
terms with the centralization variable. The results from 26 of the 27 regressions were consistent with 
our main findings. The only exception was that removing Denmark from the sample pushed the 
significance of the interaction term with the PM's environmentalism to p<.13. 
 
A fourth robustness test was run to gauge the effect of possible errors in Kassim's categorization of 
national executives as either centralized or decentralized. Model 2 of Table 2 was run 27 times, each 
time assuming that one of the member states had been miscategorized along this measure of 
centralization. 24 of the 27 regressions maintained a significant effect for the interaction between the 
PM's environmentalism and centralization (exceptions being Belgium, Denmark and Italy). All 27 
regressions maintained a significant effect for the environmental minister's environmentalism and only 
one regression, that miscategorizing Italy, pushed the significance of the interaction term with the 
environment minister beyond a standard significance threshold (p<.10). 
 
In sum, all of these alternative specifications provide support for our main finding on the effect of 
partiesÕ commitment to environmental protection on government policies: the environmentalism of 
prime ministerial parties positively affects on the likelihood that governments take stronger 
environmental positions in centralized executives, while the environmentalism of environmental 
ministers' parties have positive effects in decentralized executives. 
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Table A.1 Fifty-Five Environmental Policy Issues from Twenty-seven Legislative Proposals 
 
Name of legislative proposal and issues raised 
The accelerated phasing-in of double hull or equivalent design requirements for single hull oil tankers 
(COD/2000/067) 
¥ The speed at which single hull tankers should be phased out 
Energy Efficiency Requirements for Ballasts for Fluorescent Lighting (COD/1999/127) 
¥ The length of the transition period for phasing out inefficient lights 
¥ The complete phasing out of inefficient magnetic ballasts 
The Common Organisation of the Markets in the Sugar Sector (COD/2000/250) 
¥ The duration of the extension of the current scheme 
¥ The reduction of production quotas 
¥ The abolition of subsidies for storage costs 
Technical Measures for the Conservation of Fishery Resources (COD/1996/160) 
¥ The types of nets permitted for fishing 
The Common Organisation of the Market in Beef and Veal (COD/1998/109) 
¥ The reduction of the support price 
Community Structural Assistance in the Fisheries Sector (COD/1998/347) 
¥ The scrap-build penalty to qualify for funding 
¥ The linkage between funding and conservation objectives 
Types of Behaviour which Seriously Infringe the Rules of the Common Fisheries Policy 
(COD/1999/050) 
¥ The harmonization of infringements and sanctions regarding common fisheries policy 
Control Measures Applicable in the Area Covered by the Convention on Future Multilateral Co-
operation in the North-East Atlantic Fisheries (CNS/1999/138) 
¥ The committee for implementing the regulation 
Proposal for a Regulation on Production Aid for Cotton (CNS/1999/202) 
¥ The size of the penalty for excessive production 
¥ The level of national guarantees quantities 
Establishing a Support System for Producers of Certain Arable Crops to Include Flax and Hemp Grown 
for Fibre (CNS/1999/236) 
¥ The restriction of the support scheme for short flax and hemp 
¥ The restriction of the support scheme for long flax and hemp 
Conservation of Fishery Resources through Technical Measures for the Protection of Juveniles of 
Marine Organisms (CNS/1999/255) 
¥ The prohibition of fishing for sand eels in the North Sea 
Regulation Concerning the Financial Instrument for the Environment (LIFE +) (COD/2004/218) 
¥ The inclusion of nature 
¥ The inclusion of environmental technology activities 
Directive on Ambient Air Quality and Cleaner Air for Europe (COD/2005/183) 
¥ The postponement of the deadline for targets regarding certain pollutants 
¥ Targets for fine particles, PM2.5 
Directive on Waste (COD/2005/281) 
¥ The classification of incineration as recovery 
¥ Waste prevention targets 
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¥ Recycling targets 
Regulation Establishing Measures for the Recovery of the Southern Hake and Norway Lobster Stocks 
in the Cantabrian Sea and Western Iberian peninsula 
¥ The closure of areas for fishing 
¥ The method of controlling fishing / how fishing effort should be measured 
¥ The vessels that should be included 
¥ The level of the mortality rate 
Regulation Establishing Measures for the Recovery of the Sole Stocks in the Western Channel and the 
Bay of Biscay (CNS/2003/327) 
¥ The type of plan to be adopted Ð recovery or management 
¥ The breadth of the tolerance margin 
Proposal for a regulation: European Fisheries Fund (CNS/2004/169) 
¥ Replacement of engines 
Regulation on the Common Organisation of the Markets in the Sugar Sector (CNS/2005/118) 
¥ The size of the price cut 
Directive Establishing a Framework for Community Action to Achieve a Sustainable Use of Pesticides 
(COD/2006/132) 
¥ Areal spraying of crops 
¥ The setting of targets for reducing the use of pesticides 
Proposal for a regulation on modifications to the common agricultural policy (CNS/2008/104) 
¥ The transfer of funds from CAP to rural development 
¥ The shift of CAP funding away from production 
Directive on the Promotion of Clean and Energy-efficient Road Transport Vehicles (COD/2005/283) 
¥ The scope of application of the directive 
¥ The amount of discretion given to member states in implementation 
¥ The monetary value assigned to each unit of CO-2 pollution 
Directive on Environmental Quality Standards in the Field of Water Policy and Amending Directive 
2000/60/EC (COD/2006/129) 
¥ The inclusion of specific measures to ensure water quality 
¥ The list of pollutants 
¥ The use of measures from sediment and organisms as tests for mercury, chlorine and organic 
chemicals 
¥ The definition of mixing zones 
Directive Amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Include Aviation Activities in the Scheme for 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading within the Community (COD/2006/304) 
¥ The total amount of CO2 emission rights to be allocated 
¥ Provisions for new entrants 
¥ The start date 
Regulation Setting Emission Performance Standards for New Passenger Cars as Part of the 
Community's Integrated Approach to Reduce CO2 Emissions from Light-duty Vehicles 
(COD/2007/297) 
¥ The definition of the utility parameter 
¥ Penalties for excess emissions 
¥ The setting of long-term targets 
¥ Timing of medium-term target 
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Regulation on the Common Organisation of the Market in Wine and Amending Certain Regulations 
(CNS/2007/0138) 
¥ Distillation 
Regulation on the Protection of Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems in the High Seas from the Adverse 
Impacts of Bottom Fishing Gears (CNS/2007/0224) 
¥ Depth Limit 
¥ Observer Coverage 
Directive Establishing a Framework for Community Action in the Field of Marine Environmental 
Policy (Marine Strategy Directive) (2005/0211/COD) 
¥ The definition of Ôgood environmental statusÕ 
¥ The timeline for achieving good environmental status 
 
Figure 1: The Importance of Party Ideology and Institutional Context for Envi-
ronmental Position-taking
Note: Coefficients taken from Table 2, Model 2 with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. The “central-
ized” and “decentralized” point estimates illustrate that the importance of a pro-environment ideology is
contingent on institutional context. The “abs difference” line is the relevant interaction term from the model
and represents a significance test of the difference between the two estimates above it.
Table 1: Environmental Issues and Positions from the Proposal on Waste
Issues and positions Actors
Should the EU allow waste incineration to be classified as recovery?
Least environmental position
0: Yes, and with low energy-efficiency requirements 0: BE, FR, IT
Intermediate positions
40-80: Yes, but with a formula including strict energy
efficiency requirements to determine whether incineration
can be classified as recovery. Higher numbers refer to
support for stricter energy efficiency requirements
40: COM, FI, DE, EL,
IE, LU, NL, PT, UK
60: AT, CY, CZ, DK,
EE, HU, LV, LT, MT,
PL, SI, SK, ES
80: SE
Most environmental position
100: Under no condition 100: EP
Should the EU set waste prevention targets?
Least environmental position
0: No EU obligation to have waste prevention targets 0: FR, DE, EL, IT, MT,
PL, UK
Intermediate positions
20: MSs obliged to have targets and may determine spe-
cific qualitative or quantitative targets for programmes
20: AT, CY, CZ, EE,
HU, IE, LV, LT, LU, NL,
PT, SI, SK, ES
30: MSs obliged to have prevention targets and shall
determine specific quantitative and qualitative targets
30: COM, BE, DK, FI,
SE
Most environmental position
100: 2008 levels by 2012 100: EP
Should the EU set targets for recycling?
Least environmental position
0: No new targets 0: COM, AT, CY, CZ,
EE, FI, FR, DE, EL, HU,
IE, LV, LT, LU, MT, NL,
PL, SI, SK, SE, UK
Most environmental position
100: 50% for household waste by 2020 and 70% for con-
struction waste by 2020
100: EP, BE, DK, IT,
PT, ES
Note: (COD/2005/281). COM: Commission; EP: European Parliament; AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; CY:
Cyprus; CZ: The Czech Republic; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; FI: Finland: FR: France; DE: Germany; EL:
Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IT: Italy; LV: Latvia; LT: Lithuania; LU: Luxembourg; MT: Malta; NL:
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Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities of Strongest and Weakest Environmental Posi-
tions Under Different Conditions
(a) Centralized Executives (b) Decentralized Executives
Note: Left: probabilities of governments with centralized executives taking the strongest and weakest
environmental positions given prime ministers with different levels of pro-environment ideology. Right:
same for governments with decentralized executives given environment ministers with different levels of pro-
environment ideology. Model specified in Table 2, Model 2 with pro-environment ideology varied from lowest
to highest observed values, while other variables held at their means (for continuous variables) or modes (for
dichotomous variables). A bootstrap procedure is applied to estimate 90% confidence intervals.
Table A.2: Summary Statistics
Dependent Variable N Mean sd Min Max
Environmental Position
0–100 Scale 1,022 42.6 41.7 0 100
Weakest (x = 0) 408 (40%)
Intermediate (0 < x < 100) 370 (36%)
Strongest (x = 100) 244 (24%)
Explanatory Variables N Mean sd Min Max
CMP Environmental Protection
PM 1,022 3.7 2.6 0.0 12.9
log (PM + 1) 1,022 1.4 0.6 0.0 2.6
Environment Minister 1,022 6.1 6.9 0.0 44.2
log (Environment Minister + 1) 1,022 1.7 0.7 0.0 3.8
Centralization Ministerial Autonomy 1,022 52%
log (GDP per capita) 909 10.2 0.4 9.2 11.3
Other States ‘Strongest’ (count) 909 4.2 4.5 0 15
Commission ‘Strongest’ 909 32%
EP ‘Strongest’ 909 62%
1
Figure A.1: Dependent Variable: National Governments’ Positions on Environ-
mental Policy Issues
Note: Left: Distribution of governments’ positions on 0-100 policy scales, on which 100 refers to the strongest
environmental position. Right: Our recoding of these positions into the three-category dependent variable.
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Table A.3: Robustness Test I: Issue Heterogeneity
1 vs 0 2 vs 0
CMP Environmental Protection:
log (PM + 1) −0.37 −0.08
(0.34) (0.35)
x Centralization 0.48 0.88†
(0.42) (0.49)
log (Environment Minister + 1) 0.28 0.66∗
(0.25) (0.29)
x Centralization −0.25 −1.01∗
(0.35) (0.41)
Centralization 0.17 0.97
(0.67) (0.85)
log (GDP pc) 2.09∗∗ 1.84∗∗
(0.45) (0.44)
Other States ‘Strongest’ −0.24∗ 0.18∗∗
(0.11) (0.07)
Commission ‘Strongest’ 0.80 −0.16
(0.97) (0.57)
EP ‘Strongest’ −1.03 −0.76
(0.96) (0.53)
Constant −21.12∗∗ −21.43∗∗
(4.49) (4.32)
Observations 717 563
Log Likelihood −295.19 −251.39
Akaike Inf. Crit. 612.38 524.78
Issue level Variance 9.27 1.99
(3.04) (1.41)
Note: †p<0.10; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01. Paired logit models with random effects
at the level of issues using “lme4” package in R (Bates et al. 2014). 0:
weakest; 1: intermediate; and 2: strongest pro-environment position on
specific issues.
3
Table A.4: Robustness Test II: Measurement Error in CMP Data
1 vs 0 2 vs 0
CMP Environmental Protection:
log (PM + 1) -0.12 0.02
(0.34) (0.44)
x Centralization 0.38 1.97∗∗
(0.44) (0.65)
log (Environment Minister + 1) 0.66∗ 1.52∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.38)
x Centralization -0.72 -2.08∗∗∗
(0.37) (0.56)
Centralization 0.93 1.17
(0.66) (1.11)
log (GDP pc) 0.74∗ 0.65
(0.33) (0.40)
Other States ‘Strongest’ -0.12∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03)
Commission ‘Strongest’ 0.39∗ 0.41
(0.17) (0.25)
EP ‘Strongest’ -0.87∗∗∗ -0.14
(0.18) (0.23)
Constant -7.77∗ -11.78∗∗
(3.16) (4.00)
Observations 717 563
Log Likelihood -451.0 -266.6
Note:
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001. Paired logit models that ac-
count for error in the CMP measures, as estimated by Benoit, Laver
and Mikhaylov (2009). Models estimated using the SIMEX package
in R by Lederer and Kchenhoff (2013) that implements the SIMEX
algorithm of Cook and Stefanski (1994). 0: weakest; 1: intermediate;
and 2: strongest pro-environment position on specific issues.
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